Published 2002
by International Monetary Fund, IMF Institute in [Washington, D.C.] .
Written in English
Edition Notes
| Statement | Eduardo Ley. |
| Genre | Econometric models. |
| Series | IMF working paper -- WP/02/81 |
| Contributions | IMF Institute., International Monetary Fund. |
| The Physical Object | |
|---|---|
| Pagination | 12 p. : |
| Number of Pages | 12 |
| ID Numbers | |
| Open Library | OL19190236M |
The formal parallelism between game theory and statistical decision theory has been fruitfully exploited since Wald () realized that the analysis of two-person zero-sum games provided a useful framework for the theory of minimax statistical decision. This paper presents a parallelism between the axiomatic solution for a nonzero-sum bargaining game and the posterior by: 3. Title: Statistical Inference as a Bargaining Game - WP/02/81 Created Date: 5/15/ PMAuthor: Eduardo Ley. Downloadable! This paper extends the analogy previously established by Leamer (a), between a Bayesian inference problem and an economics allocation problem, and shows that posterior modes can be interpreted as optimal outcomes of a bargaining game. This bargaining game, over a parameter value, is played between two players: the researcher, with preferences represented by the . Downloadable (with restrictions)! This paper extends the analogy, previously established by Learner (a), between a Bayesian inference problem and an economics allocation problem to show that posterior modes can be interpreted as optimal outcomes of a bargaining game. This bargaining game, over a parameter value, is played between two players: the researcher (with preferences represented .
This paper extends the analogy, previously established by Learner (a), between a Bayesian inference problem and an economics allocation problem to show that posterior modes can be interpreted as optimal outcomes of a bargaining game. This bargaining game, over a parameter value, is played between two players: the researcher (with preferences represented by the prior) and the . Download Citation | Statistical Inference As a Bargaining Game | This paper extends the analogy previously established by Leamer (a), between a Bayesian inference problem and an economics. Statistical Inference as a Bargaining Game - CORE Reader. Title: Statistical Inference Author: George Casella, Roger L. Berger Created Date: 1/9/ PM.
This bargaining game, over a parameter value, is played between two players: the researcher, with preferences represented by the prior, and the data, with preferences represented by the likelihood. Keywords: Social Welfare Function, Social Information Function, Contract Curve, Nash bargaining solution, Bayesian Inference, Posterior Mode. $\begingroup$ Uh,it's also by one of the founders of the subject,Adam."Don't read the students,read the MASTERS!"- Abel. Hardy's A COURSE IN PURE MATHEMATICS and van der Waerden's MODERN ALGEBRA are both hopelessly "outdated" in terms of notation and sometimes subject matter,but both are still very strongly recommended by are William Feller's AN INTRODUCTION TO . matter of this course. The central tool for various statistical inference techniques is the likelihood method. Below we present a simple introduction to it using the Poisson model for radioactive decay. Probability vs. likelihood. In the introduced Poisson model for a given, say = 2, we can observe a function. CiteSeerX - Document Details (Isaac Councill, Lee Giles, Pradeep Teregowda): This paper extends the analogy previously established by Leamer (a), between a Bayesian inference problem and an economics allocation problem, to show that posterior modes can be interpreted as optimal outcomes of a bargaining game. This bargaining game, over a parameter value, is played between two players: .
